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EVOLUTIONARY DUE PROCESS 
Louis J. Virelli III 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of evolution instruction in American public schools is be-
coming increasingly complex, both legally and politically.  Until recently, 
the controversy over whether and how to teach evolution in public school 
science classes has been singularly focused on the constitutional limits of 
government support for religion under the First Amendment‘s Establish-
ment Clause.  Current measures in Louisiana and Texas, however, represent 
a shift toward a new ―adjudicative model‖ for addressing questions of evo-
lution instruction.  This adjudicative model permits individual educators to 
treat evolution issues on a case-by-case basis, which, in turn, implicates a 
new constitutional issue in the evolution education debate: procedural due 
process.  By creating powerful disincentives for anti-evolutionist policy-
makers, procedural due process concerns could affect the future of evolu-
tion education even more profoundly than does the Establishment Clause.  
This Essay explores the relationship between evolution education policy 
and procedural due process by first identifying and defining the adjudica-
tive model.  It then considers the model‘s constitutional ramifications for 
evolution instruction, concluding that this new approach to policymaking 
introduces procedural due process concerns that radically alter the legal and 
political calculus of the debate over evolution education. 
II. THE ADJUDICATIVE MODEL 
The adjudicative model is a new approach to combating evolution in-
struction that emerged in response to a series of pro-evolution decisions in 
the federal courts.  Prior to this new approach, anti-evolutionists had put 
forth generally applicable, detailed mandates regarding the teaching of evo-
lution in public schools.  The adjudicative model, by contrast, relies on 
higher-level policy statements that do not necessarily focus explicitly or ex-
clusively on evolution; rather, the adjudicative model empowers individual 
educators to engage student inquiries about evolution on a case-by-case ba-
sis.  This transfer of discretionary authority to local educators fundamental-
ly alters the nature of the government action involved in addressing 
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administrative law.1  Instead of confronting the evolution issue through ge-
neralized legislation or rulemaking, the adjudicative model encourages state 
and local governments to treat questions of evolution instruction as indivi-
dualized cases to be ―adjudicated‖ by educators as they occur. 
The adjudicative model is the product of the ongoing evolution instruc-
tion debate in the federal courts.  Because this debate is fundamentally 
about religion, conflicts about whether and how evolution should be taught 
in public school science classes have centered on the Establishment Clause.2  
A series of pro-evolution decisions,3 however, forced anti-evolutionists to 
move from straightforward, religion-based attacks on evolution to more in-
direct, facially neutral ones.  The courts rejected this move as well when, 
with the Kitzmiller and Selman cases in 2005, they made clear that even fa-
cially secular evolution disclaimers violate the Establishment Clause.4  Pro-
hibited from engaging in legislation or rulemaking that confronts evolution 
education directly, anti-evolutionists shifted their focus toward higher-level 
policy statements described as promoting an open-minded, critical academ-
ic dialogue about the sciences.  These broad policy statements promote a 
regime under which individual teachers in individual classrooms decide 
how they will address questions about the veracity of evolutionary theory. 
Recent enactments in Louisiana and Texas typify the adjudicative 
model.  In June of 2008, Louisiana passed a statute requiring the State 
Board of Secondary and Elementary Education to ―allow and assist . . . 
teachers‖ to help students think critically about ―scientific theories . . . in-
cluding . . . evolution.‖5  In March of 2009, the Texas State Board of Educa-
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―all sides of scientific evidence,‖ including with regard to evolution.7  Both 
Louisiana and Texas enacted these measures while facing significant na-
tional attention, and they did so with input from representatives on both 
sides of the evolution instruction debate.8  Although the enactments do not 
make any explicit statements about how or whether evolution should be 
taught, they are widely understood to represent anti-evolutionists‘ latest at-
tempt to frustrate public evolution instruction by supporting critical treat-
ment of some scientific theories, including evolution, by individual 
educators on a case-specific basis.9  When examined more closely, howev-
er, the adjudicative model may do the anti-evolutionist cause more harm 
than good. 
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND THE ADJUDICATIVE MODEL 
There are two significant consequences of the shift toward the adjudi-
cative model.  First, the Establishment Clause analysis, particularly as it de-
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neutral policies like the adjudicative model do not fit easily into the Court‘s 
Establishment Clause rubric.11  Second, and more importantly for purposes 
of this discussion, evolution proponents will have a new weapon at their 
disposal in protecting the integrity of evolution instruction in science 
classes: procedural due process (―PDP‖) objections. 
PDP challenges may seem relatively benign in the context of the evolu-
tion debate, particularly when compared to substantive objections under the 
Establishment Clause.  There are two reasons, however, why the Due 
Process Clause could be more effective than the Establishment Clause in 
combating educational approaches that are adverse to evolution.  First, whe-
reas Establishment Clause challenges become more difficult when—as with 
the adjudicative model—policy measures become less specific in their 
treatment of evolution or religion, PDP objections to such measures are 
likely to succeed.  A simple application of the three-part balancing test for 
PDP claims articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge12 
makes this clear.  In situations where, for example, educators are confronted 
with a student inquiry about the veracity or exclusivity of evolution as an 
explanation of human origins,13 any response that supports the biblical or 
any other religion-based explanation immediately implicates the students‘ 
First Amendment liberty interest in being protected from government estab-
lishment of religion.14  Moreover, when the decision as to how to respond to 
a student question is made by individual teachers or administrators, the risk 
of erroneous deprivation of that interest is significant; individuals who are 
                                                                                                                           
test in an evolution disclaimer case), denying cert. to Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 
F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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mers Under the Establishment Clause, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423, 434–44 (2006) (arguing that current 
doctrine is both over- and under-inclusive in dealing with facially neutral state action implicating the 
Establishment Clause). 
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  424 U.S. 319 (1976) (prescribing a three-part balancing test to evaluate PDP questions in which 
the individual‘s protected interest is weighed against the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest 
under the existing procedural regime and the government‘s interest in not employing additional proce-
dures) (link). 
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student who instigates a discussion of alternatives to evolution, the Establishment Clause analysis may 
vary significantly.  A teacher‘s unsolicited introduction of a creationist account of human origins into 
the classroom, for instance, would likely be perceived to have a very different purpose and primary ef-
fect under Lemon than a response to a question from a student about how creationism can be reconciled 
with Darwinism.  Whereas the former appears religiously motivated and sympathetic, the latter could be 
more easily justified in terms of the secular, pedagogical goals of respecting and promoting student cu-
riosity.  As a result, the above example of a student prompting the discussion was chosen because it 
represents the closer constitutional question under the Establishment Clause, and thus is a more power-
ful example of the relative clarity of the procedural due process analysis when applied to the adjudica-
tive model. 
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as, inter alia, any ―interest within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment‖) (link); Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947) (stating that the Establishment Clause has been incorporated into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) (link). 
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untrained in the Constitution and are asked to make contemporaneous deci-
sions about how to address the evolution debate in the classroom are highly 
likely to overstep their constitutional bounds without the presence of proce-
dural protections.15  Finally, the government has little interest in allowing 
these decisions to be made without any process.  There is no obvious reason 
why such decisions must be made quickly and without prior deliberation.  
Delaying the answer to a student inquiry may be pedagogically inconve-
nient and pose additional administrative costs, but when weighed against 
the students‘ strong liberty interests and the high probability that those in-
terests will be threatened if no additional process is provided, at least some 
opportunity for notice and a hearing is constitutionally required. 
In addition to the likelihood that they will be successful, PDP chal-
lenges are problematic for anti-evolutionists because of their ready availa-
bility.  Legislative or rulemaking efforts to combat evolution instruction are 
generally subject to a single Establishment Clause challenge and the resul-
tant costs to schools and educators, although potentially significant, are 
therefore relatively predictable and easy to control.  PDP challenges, on the 
other hand, could be a viable option every time an educator chooses to in-
troduce or entertain a question about the validity of evolutionary theory.  
This prevalence will deter educators from engaging in a scientific ―critique‖ 
of evolution.  Moreover, although the possibility of success in defending an 
indeterminate, facially neutral policy measure like the adjudicative model 
may encourage schools to more readily defend against an Establishment 
Clause challenge (particularly if there is strong ideological support for that 
position in the community), PDP challenges to the adjudicative model will 
be more frequent, fact-specific, and successful.  This makes PDP challenges 
not only highly disruptive to educators, but also far less likely to incite the 
same degree of public passion or support from anti-evolutionists as a single 
Establishment Clause challenge designed to invalidate an entire policy.  The 
inevitability of, and difficulty in defending against, a PDP challenge, 
coupled with the fact that even a successful defense does not insulate a 
school or educator against the ultimate Establishment Clause action, makes 
these challenges a powerful deterrent for educators weighing whether to en-
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104:251 (2010) Evolutionary Due Process 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/2/ 256 
IV. THE ANTI-EVOLUTIONIST RESPONSE 
There are two obvious questions raised by the suggestion that the 
availability of PDP challenges under the adjudicative model will seriously 
impact the evolution debate.  The first is whether educators could simply 
avoid the issue by adopting preemptive procedures for addressing student 
concerns about evolution instruction.  The problem with this response is 
that it does little to alleviate the difficulties for anti-evolutionists created by 
the adjudicative model.  Rather than facilitate educators‘ ability to address 
the evolution issue on a case-by-case basis, adopting procedures beforehand 
would deter classroom discussions about alternate theories of human origins 
that the adjudicative model seeks to promote.  Moreover, since it would on-
ly make sense to adopt a procedural regime that is constitutionally sound, 
the deterrent effect of a voluntary procedural system would likely be even 
greater than one prescribed by the courts.   
A second question is why the individualized nature of PDP challenges 
is somehow a more powerful deterrent to anti-evolutionist policymakers 
than that of individualized, ―as-applied‖ Establishment Clause objections.  
The answer lies in the likelihood of success of PDP challenges and their re-
sultant attractiveness for the movant as compared with Establishment 
Clause challenges.  Successful PDP challenges create an administrative 
burden for educators on top of the cost of litigating an Establishment Clause 
case.  This additional cost is also useful to movants because it could be suf-
ficient on its own to discourage educators from taking the risk of engaging 
students in any discussion of evolution that even approaches the constitu-
tional line, and thereby to preclude consideration of the Establishment 
Clause question altogether.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Anti-evolutionists‘ adoption of the adjudicative model is understanda-
ble in light of the consistent constitutional rulings against more direct at-
tempts to combat the teaching of evolution in public schools.  What 
proponents of this new approach are likely missing, however, is the poten-
tially negative effect of procedural due process challenges on their ability to 
effectively limit evolution instruction.  By moving their political focus from 
broad legislative prescriptions for evolution education to an adjudicative 
model designed to address questions about human origins on an individual 
basis, evolution opponents have exposed educators to a potential barrage of 
PDP challenges that will at minimum frustrate, and possibly completely de-
ter, any attempts to introduce alternative theories of evolution into public 
science classrooms. 
